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Democracy in Poland
A Few Skeptical Comments
A
fter the fall of communism in 1989, Poland wanted to 
biuld—more or less—the kind of society that exists 
in the West. "More or less" was thought to be an 
adequate description of that vision. It was "more or less" supposed 
to be a democracy. In the nctme of this democratic vision, it was 
decided to carry out all of the needed and possible societal reforms. 
It is not clear, at least not to me, what vision of society spawned the 
reforms that were eventually imdertaken.
Naturally, it could be argued that there was not any such 
vision, that since the downfall of the socialist system with its central 
planiung, no reforms could effectively be applied. First of all, I 
believe this notion to be untrue. Secondly, it contains a serious 
logical flaw, particularly in the Polish case. If we are in transition, 
then our journey must have a destination. While we may know our 
point of departure, I doubt if our direction is clearly established. A 
manifestation of this lack of direction occurred during the most 
recent parliamentary elections in Poland, and it would be wrong to 
blame the electorate for being pohtically inexperienced. I am 
assuming that the transition is from decrepit totalitarianism to 
democracy and a market economy. Nevertheless, as it soon became 
apparent, it is still not known towards what model of democracy 
and to which market economy we are moving. What was consid­
ered obvious five years ago, is not so obvious today. The theory and 
practice of a democracy and a market economy—as already proven 
in some parts of the world—can yield good results in coimtries with 
a history of authoritarian government. It remains unclear whether 
the same results can be achieved in semi-democratic states, and 
Poland could conceivably remain such for many more years to 
come. Poland could enter into a phase of officially declared democ­
racy, in which only a minimal effort is applied in actual practice.
The illusion of societal unity initiated this process, with total 
disregard for the real and presumed social issues, which were 
nevertheless sufficiently tangible to affect many socio-economic 
groups. Collective astonishment swept the country when the first 
political cmd economic conflicts occurred. After all, if we had just 
regained sovereignty and had just begun budding democracy with
the best possible economic system, then what was the point of this 
conflict? Perhaps this question was incorrectly stated from the 
beginning; perhaps the essence of all these Polish problems—easily 
viewed as needless disputes, a demonstrated lack of democratic 
maturity, a narrowness of political interest, etc. — lies elsewhere.
Let us therefore propose two hypotheses for consideration, and 
explore their possible implications:
1. Democracy by definition means a system which guarantees the 
freedom of the individual; but in Poland, such individual free­
dom is still not espoused as the highest value, and is accepted as 
such neither by the society at large nor by the major political 
forces within the society.
If we assume, based on non-socialist principles, that the aim of 
a democratic system is to create and uphold the freedom of the 
individual, fostering his or her growth along with imobstructed 
popular influence on political institutions, and moreover, if we 
assume that the state's only reason for existence is to defend and 
guarantee the individual's freedom, and therefore the public do­
main exists only as a platform for the ambitious, then none of these 
conditions have been achieved in Poland. Democracy in Poland 
was murdered by politics at the very beginning, and so far there are 
no signs of its imminent resurrection. Individual freedoms are real 
in the sense that the restrictions in effect imder the old regime have 
been eliminated. However, governing institutions, busy with other 
matters of great importance, have not taken any necessary steps to 
create conditions for the development of these freedoms. We have 
political rights, but indispensable to their intelligent and sensible 
exercise is the existence of tangible political alternatives — and not 
merely parliamentary elections in which we are forced to choose (if 
we even want to vote at aU) between fictions.
It should not be surprising that the people themselves have 
attached relatively little value to those freedoms. The new freedoms 
are still primarily associated with the elimination of legal restric­
tions, such as those connected with the right to possess a valid
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passport for foreign travel, or the abolishment of media censorship. 
AU these factors reflect a minimalist interpretation of individucJ 
freedom in Poland. Recently, in response to a parliamentary initia­
tive, Michal Str^k, the prime minister's chief of staff, indicated that 
the government can not legally impose media restrictions on free­
dom of speech because we now live in a political environment 
where the enforcement of such a policy would no longer be feasible. 
Freedom of speech is not considered an absolute cmd fimdamental 
value, but rather only a legislative fact.
Freedom in a democratic society primarily concerns freedom in 
the political realm. In Poland, however, we are dealing with the 
gradual autonomization of the political arena. The media tactics of 
the various recent governments provide good examples of this. 
There are ongoing complaints that the government provides insuf­
ficient information regarding even its day-to-day agendas. This is 
in marked contrast to government and media relationships in all the 
Western democracies, where everything is done to provide the 
media and the public with current information — which does not 
necessarily mean that such information is always entirely truthful 
and that there is no conscious effort at manipulating the public's 
perception. Such information has been withheld in varying degrees 
by Polish governments since 1989; however, the current coalition 
government has gone further in this regard than any other. It could 
even be said that based on such conduct the state's democratic 
vision has become severely impaired. This demonstrates an ex­
treme autonomization of the political arena pursued more or less 
consciously by every consecutive government administration. Such 
a tendency may be unavoidable, since real democracy is an impedi­
ment and obstacle for every governing power group that puts a high 
priority on effective and efficient governing. Politicians, firmly 
believing that they know what they are doing and why, often begin 
subconsciously to develop a disdain for those who are not familiar 
with their true motives nor have the opportunity to discover them 
— in other words, the average citizen.
Why then does democracy assume the involvement of its 
citizens in the consideration of all political decisions? It has nothing 
to do with courting the free press, mass media, and the electorate in 
order to gain victory in the next elections; it is a recognition of the 
tangible rather than merely fictitious political rights of citizens. 
Participation in political life is closely dependent upon knowledge 
of political issues, politicians' motives, and legislative outcomes. 
The entire democratic world is currently facing a "crisis of democ­
racy" as active participation of voting citizens in the arena of state 
policies, becomes increasingly difficult due to the increasingly 
complicated and technical nature of many economic or military 
issues. Because of the active presence of the mass media, however, 
there are no indications of politicians attempting to escape from 
public scrutiny. Politicians regret and lament that they are unable 
to inform adequately society about their actions, rather than being 
satisfied with the situation. AU the successive governments of 
newly independent Poland have demonstrated their contempt for 
the notion of political freedom, both in the formal sense as well as in 
the practical possession of real political rights, but the current 
government has carried this contemptuous attitude to new ex­
tremes. IronicaUy, it is very much in line with an old political
principle from Poland's past, namely "the governing of the Poles 
without any Poles" (an idea that brought soimd defeat to its origi­
nator, Aleksander Wielopolski).
Current economic policies provide a different example of the 
autonomization of poUtical life from societal values, especiaUy in 
regard to the issue of poUticcd freedom. I cim not concerned about 
the outcomes of various political decisions (the overhaul of our tax 
system, for example), but about the process of decision making. 
NaturaUy, such decisions occur within the formed framework of a 
democratic process, that is a piece of legislation proposed by the 
government is debated and voted upon by the parUament, and then 
signed into law by the President. It is rather the long term conse­
quences of the enacted economic policy decisions which are not 
subject to pubUc debate, and that successive governments, either 
knowingly or unintentionally, have concealed the true extent of 
those consequences. Even assuming that the first decisions enacted 
by Leszek Balcerowicz (Finance Minister in the first post-commu­
nist administration in 1989) had to be imposed more or less by force, 
all subsequent ones did not have to be. Lacking any sensible 
answers and fearful of public backlash, successive administrations 
have consciously ignored the two paramoimt issues in the future of 
Poland's economy: coal mining and agriculture. As a result, we 
continue to live in a country in which energy and food are subsi­
dized out of our own pockets, without knowing the extent of these 
subsidies or whether it makes any sense to provide them at all.
T
hese are matters of enormous significance for us today 
and for the future of our children. We often hear the 
reply that the intolerable possibility of economic anar­
chy looms as a consequence of public debate on economic strategy. 
Sensible it might be (though of this I am not certain) but beyond 
those supposed pragmatic principles lies an assortment of values, a 
choice which some politicians do not realize or don't want to 
acknowledge its existence. The choice has to do with the primacy of 
the economy over democracy, or, in other words, whether the 
political domain's rights are superior to all other values, or whether 
in a quest for other aims, especially economic ones, the values of the 
political domain can be overlooked. This dilemma could be consid­
ered in even more dramatic categories, by posing the following 
question: is it the opinion of politicians at large that the role of good 
government istoassurea minimum level of well being (meaning the 
minimum of social rights, which, after all, were guaranteed even 
under conununist rule), or is it rather the creation of such freedoms 
as would allow the citizens themselves to maintain their own 
prosperity? Is it then sufficient to maintain a state of democratic 
appearances while applying an authoritarian policy if it brings 
about sound economic results? Or instead, do democratic principles 
need to be applied in more than a formal sense?
The kind of answer this question receives, which incidentally 
cannot and should not be expected from politicians themselves, 
determines whether democracy is really needed in Poland (as well 
as in other postcommunist coimtries) and why. So far, it does not 
seem that democracy is in the slightest sense necessary for the 
success of economic reforms, whose objective is to implement 
market mechanisms and re-establish principles of private owner-
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ship. It is not at aU certain whether democracy is required to 
maintain law and order, or for the achievement of individual 
freedom, since the espousal of this right is not yet valued highly 
enough. It is not even certain whether democracy is needed to 
control and maintain the reins of power. Large scale political 
corruption, reflected in an almost complete disappearance of the 
connection between political life and truth, make it impossible for 
public opinion to exert any control over the situation. Therefore, 
democracy's purpose resembles one's clothing and wardrobe: each 
item of which is intended for a specific occasion. In a sense, 
democracy is like a tuxedo, which must be worn in order to come to 
the party thrown by the European Community, if indeed we ever 
hope to be admitted to such an affair at all.
A demonstrated lack of interest in defending the freedom of the 
individual as a social value together with an utter lack of govern­
ment interest in real democracy are mutually re-enforcing tenden­
cies. While I doubt if we wiU soon embark on a course of repealing 
democratic ideals (especially those having to do with the need for 
the tuxedo), at the same time I do not think that the process of 
democratization is progressing. After all, the biggest and most 
drastic changes occurred during the first year after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, and the conditions existing in the Fall of 1990 are 
essentially identical with the state that we are in today. What will 
be the consequences of all the new economic policies with the 
equivalent lack of democratic reforms, miiumal or complete lack of 
progress in the domain of civic responsibility, discontinuance of the 
pursuit of the ideal of truth in the realm of politics, indifference to 
the quest for de Tocqueville's ideal of equality of opportunity? That 
is the subject of the second hypothesis.
2. Any lack of progress, be it in the domain of democratic and 
political reforms or in the realm of public morality, leads to the 
creation of a disgruntled society divided into economic classes 
and castes, inevitably inviting the possibility of a socio-economic 
revolution or at best a dictatorship.
It would be difficult to adopt de TocqueviUe's ideals of equality 
of opportunity as fimdamental attributes of democracy in any of the 
contemporary Eastern European societies. Moreover, it should be 
realized that the implementation of free market reforms — an 
endeavor whose aptness I do not question — is bound to cause 
economic disparity and limit equality of opportimity. Remember­
ing that, one can consider not only the validity of economic reforms 
in general, and the need for a social safety net intended to cushion 
their brutal impact, but also the behavioral, psychological and 
mental effects economic reforms bring, further restraining the de­
mocratization of the public and moral realm. I should emphasize 
that 1 do not subscribe to the socialist point of view which proclaims 
simply, that when freedom threatens equality of opportunity, the 
latter must be defended. 1 do not support this view for two reasons. 
First of aU, I am in fundamental conflict with such a notion, and do 
not believe that under current circumstances in Poland that a trade­
off between individual freedom and equality of opportunity is 
inevitable. Secondly, in Poland individual freedom in fact does not 
threaten equality of opportunity — to the contrary, the inadequate
desire for freedom and the already mentioned lack of progress in 
systemic democratization of political freedoms puts the very exist­
ence of the ideal of equality into question.
Convincing and universal examples are hard to find, and so I 
will confine myself to describing only various outward signs. The 
meaning of equality is not only or even especially confined to 
material equality. First and foremost, equality means equal access 
to the roles that are held in high esteem by the society. Equal 
opportunity also exists as an element of what we call civil society, 
and call for a parity of means for the realization of one's ambitions 
in the public arena. The current state of the post-secondary educa­
tional system is a glaring example of the absence of such equalities. 
Let us call attention to the following issues: the deficiency of access 
— on material grounds — for people in difficult economic situa­
tions; the absence of any positive, educational role models; the 
scarcity of "good Samaritans" in regard to educational issues moti­
vated by selfless participation in the political arena; and finally the 
scant demonstration of the relationship between the pursuit of 
higher education and resulting social status. Polish institutions of 
higher education find themselves in a deep crisis of not knowing to 
whom, why, and on what level they should serve as educators, 
while the continuing decline in educational standards has given 
birth to elitist and private academic institutions, which will educate 
only the few. While elitism may not necessarily be bad, an elitism 
that leaves in its wake large imeducated ghettos among the popu­
lation could produce incalculable consequences, and lead to the 
eventual radicalization of the uneducated, ignorant masses.
A
ll such examples describing the long term conse­
quences of dividing society into economic classes 
and castes by their nature can only define mere 
tendencies, rather than provide an empirical description of the 
actual situation. So, while my next example no better fulfills the 
criterion of methodical verifiability, it does illustrate the possible 
consequences of a growing separation between freedom, equality of 
opportunity, and democracy on the one hand, and tactical pragma­
tism, political corruption, and "tuxedo" democracy on the other. 
What I mean — and it may soimd paradoxical considering that 
Waldemar Pawlak's administration with its Peasant Party coalition 
is currently in power — is that the peasants and a portion of the 
working class have been brought down to the level of second class 
citizens. Obvious here is the role played by the economic situation, 
but even more important are the social and psychological conse­
quences of this situation, specifically the imposition of ecological- 
zoological-botanical garden status to 95% of Polish farmers. Be­
cause, from an economic standpoint, the farms are autarchic in 
character, and unemployment and lack of any alternatives for 
earning a living on the farm preclude the generation of even the 
most farsighted and bold vision of the proper place for this segment 
of the Polish population. Therefore, the current temporary and 
transitional state — as so declared by politicians — is in fact being 
consolidated in place, instead of real change proceeding full steam 
ahead.
The Polish peasant farmers, after a history of struggle with 
feudal and then communist persecution, after finally being granted
